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PAiTNERSHIPS
TO PROTrECT
The U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency took an unexpected and
unprecedentedstep in 1989 byinviting
their traditional adversaries in businesses and
industries to participate in a voluntary effort
to reduce emissions of 17 hazardous sub-
stances by 33% in four years and by 50% in
six years. In the period since, federal reguato-
ry agencies have created many more opportu-
nities for chiefexecutives and managers
of industrial departments of
health, safety, and envi-
ronment partici-
pate in vol-
untary programs and in
framing new regulations and stan-
dards. Recent reports ofsuccessful negotia-
tions on environmental and worker safety
protection regulations, indicate that business
and industry may have reached detente with
federal agencies on these issues. But a closer
look reveals the difficulties that remain in
bringing regulators and businesses together to
workoncontentious issues.
For example, Nancy Wegman, deputy
directoroftheOfficeofAirQualityStandards
and Safety for the EPA, says her office sought
recommendations from all the parties poten-
tiallyaffected by newoperating permit regula-
tions issued under the Clean AirAct reautho-
rization. According to Wegman, the regula-
tions are much better for having involved the
stakeholders from the beginning of the
process ofdrafting the regulations rather than
asking for their input after the EPAhad com-
pleted a detailed set ofproposed regulations.
She believes that the EPA demonstrated will-
ingness to make revisions and adjustments in
response to thesuggestions fromaffectedbusi-
nesses helped to build trust. But, noted
Wegman, "reaching true consensus is time-
consuming and it is really tough to bring do-
sure to the complex technical issues involved
in ... thissetofregulations."
Policing Poliuters Creates
Adversaries
Congress established the EPA and the
Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration (OSHA) in 1970. These agencies
were mandated to protect the environment
from industrial and other sources ofpollution
and to protect American workers from on-
the-job hazards. The mandate included broad
powers to stricdy regulate industry practices,
to carry out inspections to determinewhether
the regulations were being met, and to levy
fines or other penalties forviolations. Business
and industry managers frequently opposed
federal environment, health, and safetyregula-
tions as poorly conceived, too rigorous, and
too cosdy to achieve. Such managers lobbied
Congress for relief and challenged the
EPAand OSHA in the courts. For
almost two decades, the rela-
tionship between the
federal regulatory
agencies and
business
and
_- ~~~~industry
grew increasing-
ly bitter. Environ-
mental policy became a
defining issue in local, state, and
national political campaigns, and sepa-
rated conservatives from liberals and small
and large businessmen and farmers from
environmentalists.
The Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
commonly known as "Superfund," was
passed in 1980. Written in response to
national publicity over the health impacts of
an abandoned hazardous waste dump in the
Love Canal neighborhood in Niagara Falls,
New York, the Superfund law quickly
became the focus of a contentious environ-
mental and economicdebate.
The Superfund law's concept was simple:
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it created a trust fund from atax on rawmate-
rials used in chemical manufacturing that
would payforthecosts to theEPAofcleaning
up abandoned hazardous waste sites and for
responses to environmental catastrophes.
Whilethe EPAwas to supervise technical con-
tractors in carrying out the clean-ups, the
Department ofJustice was to identify busi-
nesses, individuals, and municipalities respon-
sible for dumping the hazardous waste, to
recover costs ofthe dean-up, and to compen-
satevictims. As the EPAsetabout implement-
ing Superfund, every decision made by the
agencywas challenged bythe parties involved.
Controversy and debate surrounded questions
such as which sites posed the greatest risk,
howtheriskshouldbequantified, whatdean-
up levels should be attained, what technology
is best and cheapest to dean up the site, what
should be done with the hazardous wastes
removed from the site, and, foremost, who
should pay for what percentage ofthe dean-
up costs and compensation. Two thousand
sites were identified for dean-up and estimat-
ed costs ofthe program escalated into the bil-
lions ofdollars.
By 1984, when the Superfund program
was to have been completed, only a handful
ofsites had been deaned up, none ofthe dif-
ferences over fundamental program policies
were resolved, the relationship between the
EPA and industry had reached an all-time
low, and both parties had been publicly dis-
graced. In 1986, with no consensus on how
to "fix" Superfund, Congress simplyextended
the law for an additional 4 years, expanded
the size of the trust fund, and authorized
research to address technical questions.
Ironically, however, they attached an unrelat-
ed requirement to the Superfund bill that
eventually brought regulators and business-
men together in meetingrooms, rather than
courtrooms, to begin an open process ofcol-
laboration in the formulation and implemen-
tation ofenvironmental regulations.
The Community Right-to-Know Act
requires major industries to report to the
EPA the amount ofemissions ofabout 300
hazardous substances byfactories andplants.
These reports are aggregated and disseminat-
ed to neighboring communities. The com-
plete list of emissions, called the Toxic
Release Inventory (TRI), provides the EPA
with baseline data to determine trends and
to monitor the impact of environmental
laws and regulations on reducing industrial
pollutants.
The first TRI was released by the EPA in
1988 and induded reports ofemission releas-
es for 1987. The numbers grabbed the atten-
tion ofboth local and national news media.
The Report showed that millions ofpounds
of the 300 chemicals were routinely being
released into air, water, and soil in every state
and major community in the United States.
Corporate chief executives met with their
legal advisors, directors of communications,
and directors of environment, safety, and
health, to develop strategies to respond to the
public concern generated by the information
in the TRI. It was apparent that since the
TRI was compiled from data provided by the
industry itself, there was litde that could be
done to attenuate the initial negative impact
from its publication. Industry could point to
the economic benefits accruing to communi-
ties with strong industrial bases and suggest
that the health and environmental effects of
many of the substances released were mini-
mal. But these arguments did little to blunt
public perception that industrial pollution of
the environment outside the factory fence
was considerably greater and more dangerous
than previously realized and that information
had been withheld by corporate officials.
Without demonstrable and substantial
progress in pollution prevention, it was dear
to business leaders that public concern would
compel Congress to strengthen environmen-
tal protection laws, giving the EPA and other
government agencies an even greater regula-
toryrole.
Chief executives needed a longer-term
strategy to prepare for future editions ofthe
TRI. They turned to their directors ofenvi-
ronment, safety and health to set up and
expedite projects in recycling, energy recov-
ery, and the treatment and disposal ofhaz-
ardous substances. Because these were long-
range efforts with significant budgetary
impacts, they had to be weighed against the
estimated costs ofpotential increases in regu-
lation and negative public image due to the
TRI. Directors of environment, safety and
strate an aggressive and effective volunteer
effort to reduce emissions. After considering
the impact a voluntary pollution prevention
and public information strategy would have
versus the traditional confrontational
response by the industry, the EPA developed
the "33/50" volunteerprogram.
Collaboration Creates Opportunities
The 33/50 program was conceived by EPA
administrator, William Reilly. Reilly set a
target for industry to voluntarily reduce
releases of 17 of the most dangerous sub-
stances on the TRI by 33% in 4 years and
by 50% within 6 years using industry-
designed engineering controls and manufac-
turing practices. The offer by the EPA to
give industry a chance to participate in a
highly visible, voluntary program of pollu-
tion prevention was accepted by 1,200
American businesses which met and exceed-
ed Reilly's goals for emission reductions. It
signaled a fundamental change in the histor-
ical relationship between government regu-
lators and business leaders. Clearly, com-
plete agreement on a partnership between
government and industry to protect envi-
ronmental and occupational health has by
no means been achieved, but the movement
toward negotiated regulations and the flexi-
bility on the part ofregulatory agencies has
been marked.
The first major test of partnering
occurred in implementing the tough new
requirements of the reauthorization of the
Clean Air Act, and continues to be a prob-
lem today. William Rosenberg, Reilly's assis-
tant administrator for air programs estab-
lished a Clean Air Act Advisory Committee
ofbusiness, labor, legal, and academic lead-
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health participated in estimating costs and, as
a result, became more deeply involved in
makingcorporatepolicies.
Industry directors ofenvironment, safety,
and health were also assigned to work with
EPAofficials to assure that thechemicals sub-
ject to being reported in the TRI included
only those of environmental and public
health concern, and to ask that the EPAhelp
educate the public on the relative risks posed
by the various kinds and amounts of com-
pounds being reported. Another important
component of the strategy was to demon-
ers to provided advice to the EPA on imple-
menting the reauthorized program of air
pollution control. With the committee's
advice and support, the EPA began an open
process of negotiation and consultation in
creating new regulations and standards
affectingindustry.
Today, the EPA manages several pro-
grams to foster the cooperation of all the
stakeholders in environmental legislation,
including the Environmental Leadership
Program, designed to find creative new
approaches to setting environmental regula-
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tions; the Green Lights Program to reduce
waste; the Reduced Risk Program to expe-
dite EPA review of new pesticides designed
to be less hazardous to the environment; the
Common Sense Initiative to maximize bene-
fits and minimize costs of regulations; and
the Community-based Environmental
Protection Project to involve citizens in
grassroots efforts to set priorities for local
environmental protection goals.
Perhaps the most ambitious new EPA
program is Project XL, established as a part
ofthe regulatory reforms put in place by the
Clinton administration. This project allows
businesses and industries that fall under fed-
eral regulations to workwith concerned citi-
zens and regulatory agency staff to create
alternative systems to meet and exceed the
pollution prevention targets set under the
technical approaches established in EPA reg-
ulations.
Federal agencies other than the EPA that
deal with environmental and occupational
health matters have also set up voluntary,
cooperative programs with industry. The
National Toxicology Program (NTP) is the
largest federal program oflong-term toxico-
logical studies of environmental chemicals,
drugs, and other agents. The NTP compiles
the Biennial Report on Carcinogens for the
U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services. The NTP Partnerships project
invites industry scientists to collaborate in
designing research studies, in developing
and validating new methods in chemical
toxicology that improve extrapolation of
results of animal experiments to humans,
and to participate in the scientific peer
review process at critical points in studies
done by the NTP. The concept of joint
NTP-industry scientific collaboration was
opposed by representatives of organized
labor and environmental advocacy groups
when it was first proposed at a public meet-
ing in March 1993. The representatives of
these organizations voiced deep concerns
that inviting industry scientists into limited
research collaborations with NTP scientists
might result in studies that do not find all
the possible hazards that might result from
human exposures or that reports ofthe stud-
ies would minimize the potential public
health implications of NTP findings. The
NTP moved cautiously ahead and in a meet-
ing in July 1996, criticism and concern had
been replaced by support for the NTP's
efforts. Participants agreed that their worries
had been valid but that the NTP had
worked openly to assure that no bias found
its way into its research studies. George
Lucier, director of the Environmental
Toxicology Program at the NIEHS, is steer-
ing efforts to open up scientific research and
peer review. Lucier says, "While conflict-of-
interest issues involving the relationship
between the NTP and industry have not
been entirely resolved, there is confidence
that these concerns can be addressed. This is
a slow process, and the partnerships must be
open, and all parties need to feel that they
are involved."
On the Horizon
Both the federal government and industry
are being downsized to reduce costs. The
need to respond to information in the TRI
highlighted the importance of the roles of
directors of environment, safety and health
in large industrial organizations in finding
methods to prevent pollution. It also gave
them a stronger voice in making corporate
policy. But these departments are subject to
the same budget and staffing cuts associated
with company efforts to "reengineer" cost
savings into their operations. In addition, a
survey of environment, safety and health
managers in 185 U.S. corporations conduct-
ed by Arthur D. Little, Inc. and released in
December 1995, found that these experts
are not entirely optimistic about their status
and potential contribution within industry.
In addition to the problem of directing
insufficient resources for environment and
safety, the survey found that senior corpo-
rate managers still consider it the mission of
environment safety and health programs to
"keep the company out of trouble." Over
70% of directors reported lack of recogni-
tion and acceptance of such programs as a
contributor to the companybottom line and
described the them as a separate "culture"
within the company. This report suggests
that corporate executives fail to recognize
the potential financial benefits that accrue
from compliance with environmental regu-
lations.
Ladd Greeno ofArthur D. Little, Inc.,
reports that companies that designed pro-
grams to improve environmental, health,
and safety performance find that the pro-
grams have boosted profits and productivity
and pleased stockholders. "Some organiza-
tions recognize that certain [environment,
safety and health] issues can affect the way
they or their entire industries do business,
and are managing their environmental func-
tion as a critical part of their business prac-
tice," says Greeno.
In the federal sector, the reinvention of
government to cut costs and balance the
budget has had an effect on the govern-
ment's ability to pursue partnerships with
industry and community groups in setting
environmental regulations. Reduced staffing
in most federal regulatory agencies means
that there are fewer employees, available to
work on both the routine regulatory pro-
grams and assume leadership in new efforts
to develop consensus and partnerships.
In addition, developing trust and pro-
ductive collaborations on environmental and
health issues requires long meetings on com-
plex technical subjects with large numbers of
stakeholders who hold diverse positions and
most of whom live and work outside of
Washington, D.C. where the regulatory
process is centered. This is difficult to
accomplish in the face of limited funds for
travel, collection and analysis of data,
research and technical support, and trained
personnel. Wegman faced this problem in
her efforts to expand partnerships and out-
reach in setting regulations under the Clean
AirAct. She notes that partnership meetings
have become routine at the highest levels of
government, industry, and labor. These are
important in providing necessary leadership,
visibility, and credibility. However, these
meetings consume staff time and scarce
funds and potentially compete with smaller,
more focused partnerships that are critically
needed to form collaborations for the
achievements of direct and measurable
improvements in regulations. Wegman's
preference is to give greater priority to small-
er, regional and local partnership meetings
of technical experts and interested citizens
that focus on specific problems and con-
tribute valuable information on how best to
protect the environment and public health
and the economic vitality of businesses and
industries and the community. Both
Wegman and Lucier agree that strong, long-
term support and commitment from the
most senior government and industry offi-
cials is necessary if true changes are to be
made in institutional behaviors.
The next several years will be critical in
determining whether the move toward part-
nerships and consensus will continue and
whether the acrimonious relationship
among supporters of industrial expansion
and ofenvironmental protection and human
health will fade into history. Will corporate
CEO's embrace the idea that protection of
the environment builds profits? Will
changes in the worldwide economy, demo-
graphics and international business manu-
facturing shift the debate outside the United
States to developing nations and markets?
One can only conjecture. But history sug-
gests that all stakeholders who believe in
partnership rather than confrontation
shouldplan to redouble theirefforts.
DanVanderMeer
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